Interactive Natural Monopoly Diagram

Explore unregulated profit maximisation, average cost pricing, and marginal cost pricing for a natural monopoly. See how economies of scale create the case for regulation. Built for AQA, Edexcel and OCR.

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Price / Cost (£)Quantity (Q)2040608010020406080100120AR = DMRLRACLRMCQ_pmQ_acP_pmP_aclearnwithotti.co.uk/diagrams
Q_pm
54.5
P_pm
£60.9
Q_ac
96.3
P_ac
£23.4
Q_me
106.4*
P_me
£14.2

* Q_me beyond displayed range — lower B or raise arSlope to bring on-chart.

Demand (AR = D)

Demand intercept110
Demand slope0.90

Steeper slope = more inelastic demand

MR is derived from AR — it falls at twice the slope. MR = 0 at Q = 61.1, the revenue-maximising output.

A natural monopoly exists when one firm can supply the whole market at a lower average cost than two or more firms could. This is common where fixed costs are very high, as with water pipes, rail track or electricity networks. This tool shows the falling long-run average cost curve and compares three ways of pricing: unregulated profit maximisation, average cost pricing and marginal cost pricing.

How to use this tool

  1. On the Demand tab, use “Demand intercept” and “Demand slope” to set the demand (AR) curve; the MR curve is derived from it.
  2. On the Costs tab, “Scale economies strength (A)” controls how steeply LRAC falls and “Minimum LRAC floor (B) £” sets the level it falls towards. The readout confirms that LRMC stays below LRAC.
  3. On the Regulation tab, switch on “Unregulated (profit max)”, “AC pricing regulation” and “MC pricing regulation”, together or one at a time, to shade supernormal profit or the loss and read the price and output for each.
  4. Turn on “Show why it’s a natural monopoly” to add the cost curve that two competing firms would face, and use the Scenarios tab for “Strong natural monopoly”, “Weak natural monopoly” and “High demand”.

What to notice

  • LRAC falls over the whole range of output the market demands, because high fixed costs are spread over more units. LRMC is below LRAC throughout, which is what pulls average cost down.
  • The two-firm curve shows that splitting output between two firms would raise average cost, because each would have to pay the fixed costs and neither would gain the full economies of scale.
  • Left unregulated, the firm produces where MR = LRMC and charges the price on the AR curve, earning supernormal profit with a high price and low output.
  • Under marginal cost pricing, price equals LRMC where it meets AR. This is the allocatively efficient output, but because LRMC is below LRAC the price is below average cost and the firm makes a loss that would need a subsidy.
  • Under average cost pricing, price is set where AR meets LRAC. The firm makes normal profit, and output is higher and price lower than under profit maximisation, but price is still above marginal cost.
  • UK regulators have used price caps such as RPI − X, used by Ofgem for energy networks, which limit how far prices can rise and give firms an incentive to cut costs. Ofwat’s water price limits used RPI + K, which added an allowance for investment. The tool does not model a price cap, but the related diagram does.

Using it in the exam

Draw a downward-sloping LRAC with LRMC below it, and AR and MR starting from the same point on the price axis. Mark the three key outputs: where MR = MC (profit maximisation), where AR = AC (average cost pricing) and where AR = MC (marginal cost pricing), and shade the profit or loss. Your chain should explain why competition is inefficient here: duplicating the network would raise average costs, so one firm is efficient, but left alone it would use its monopoly power to raise prices. Conclude with the regulator’s trade-off between allocative efficiency and allowing the firm to cover its costs.

Evaluate: Regulation solves one problem but can create others. The regulator has less information about costs than the firm, so a price cap may be set too high, allowing excess profit, or too low, discouraging investment in the network. Firms may cut quality to meet a cap, and over time regulators risk regulatory capture. Nationalisation or subsidised marginal cost pricing bring their own problems of funding and weak incentives to control costs, so no option is clearly best.

Revise the theory

Revise the theory behind this tool in our Edexcel revision notes:

Practise drawing the static versions you will need in the exam:

Frequently asked questions

What is a natural monopoly?

A natural monopoly is an industry where one firm can supply the whole market at a lower average cost than two or more firms could. It usually arises where fixed costs are very large and marginal costs are low, so long-run average cost keeps falling over the full range of market demand. Examples include water supply, rail track and national electricity and gas networks.

Why does marginal cost pricing cause a loss for a natural monopoly?

When average cost is falling, marginal cost must be below average cost. If the regulator sets price equal to marginal cost to achieve allocative efficiency, the price is also below average cost, so each unit sells for less than it costs on average. The firm makes a loss and would need a subsidy to stay in the market.

How are natural monopolies regulated in the UK?

Most are privately owned and overseen by industry regulators, such as Ofwat for water and Ofgem for gas and electricity networks. Regulators limit prices or revenues, historically using formulas such as RPI − X for energy networks, which allows prices to rise by inflation minus an efficiency factor (water used RPI + K, adding an allowance for investment). They also set quality standards and require firms to invest in their networks.

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